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IOT Network Behaviours and 
Dependencies 
Poonam Yadav, Qi Li and Richard Mortier 
Department of Computer Science & Technology, University of Cambridge 
 
To realise Digital Built Britain will require creation and use of many sources of digital data, 
particularly to achieve BIM levels 3 and 4. Many current claims suggest that many of these sources 
will arise from deployment of off-the-shelf Internet-of-Things (IoT) sensors in buildings and 
infrastructure at scale. In this paper we take an early look at some baseline data gathered from a 
set of such sensors. We perform some simple analysis of the types and rates of data these sensors 
will generate and distribute, the supporting services they will invoke, and the resulting 
infrastructure dependencies they take. We consider a wide range of sensors from environ- mental 
sensors (e.g., temperature, CO2) to some more immediately sensitive sensors (e.g., video cameras). 
 
Introduction 
Organisations including Gartner, BI Intelligence and IHS predict that the number IoT devices in 2020 will exceed 20 
billion [9, 16, 18]. If this growth is even only partly obtained, it will pose many challenges ranging from ensuring 
security of data generated and actuation enabled by the IoT, obtaining privacy of citizens monitored by and using 
IoT devices, and managing the energy demands, net- work traffic, and service dependencies produced by use of IoT 
devices. To realise BIM levels 3 and 4 will require that we tackle these challenges as we deploy this new, often 
experimental – or at least technologically optimistic! – infrastructure in the form of smart buildings and cities. 
 
The challenges posed by the current state of the IoT ecosystem are widespread, ranging across human, 
technological and environ- mental threats. In this context a threat could be defined as possible danger that might 
exploit vulnerabilities in a system to cause potential harm [4]. To minimise possible threats, the system needs   to 
provide for various security requirements: authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and 
availability [1, 22]. Additionally, privacy risks must be managed, involving data subjects’ right to control, edit, 
manage and delete information about them- selves, as well as deciding when, how and the extent to which in- 
formation about them may be communicated to others [27]. 
 
Recent years have seen both privacy and security perspective explored, analysed and presented in many research 
articles [4]. How- ever, research on how the critical end-to-end services and infrastructure components of the IoT 
ecosystem could affect scalability, availability and integrity of these systems is still patchy and lacking in detailed 
analysis. In this paper, we focus our focus on understanding the threats linked to the scalability, availability, and 
integrity that IoT sensors and actuators are going to create. We do so by collecting network packet traces for a range 
of devices over approximately one month, and analysing these data to take a first look at the protocol behaviours 
of them. 
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Methodology 
We use the term “smart environment” to refer to a smart home, office or city. In each we will likely see different, 
but overlapping, classes of IoT device. 
 
In a smart home, typical devices might include environmental sensors, security cameras, personal health and 
wearable devices, voice-controlled assistants, and robots. In smart hospitals, various IoT enabled wearable 
health monitoring and medical devices (e.g., drug monitoring and delivery systems, pacemakers), and even smart 
medical robots are integrated to provide a end-to-end efficient work- flow and service with in the hospitals [30]. 
Smart offices may use smart home devices as well as adding systems more pertinent to the shared work space 
such as resource scheduling solutions that allow employee badges to register their presence in the office. Smart 
City environment involves deployment of smart sensors on city wide scale; for example, smart traffic light 
systems, smart parking solutions. These solutions involve both local and central processing of information. 
 
To begin to understand the data types, rates, and traffic patterns caused by different IoT devices, we deployed a set 
of off-the-self IoT devices in a small test area in an office in our lab, and captured IP and local wireless traffic 
generated by these devices. Other occupants of the office were notified that the devices were present, and we 
carefully did not analyse data captured from the devices for anything other than its gross network characteristics. 
The data captured thus represents a “minimum” level of traffic, as the de- vices were largely idle and not interacted 
with as they might be in a more realistic deployment.        
 
 
 
Figure 1: Table 1 describes the devices shown.  
 
The Hive Hub (1) and Arlo Security Camera Hub (6) are 
connected via wired Ethernet; the Hive Motion Sensor (9) 
communicates with the Hive Hub using Zigbee, and the 
Security Camera connects over WiFi to the Arlo Security 
Camera Hub. Other devices (3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and the controlling 
smart phone) connect over Wi-Fi except for devices 10, 11, 12 
which connect to the smart phone over Bluetooth. The router 
reaches the Internet via wired Ethernet and the University’s 
network, and runs tcpdump to collect packets. Packet capture 
(PCAP) files are periodically copied from the router to a directly 
connected Linux host. 
 
 
 
Experimental Setup 
Within this test area, we deployed a number of off-the-self commercial IoT devices described in Table 1). All were 
connected to a local Netgear N600 Wireless Dual Band Router WNDR3700v2 running Linux OpenWrt version 
2.6.39.4 [6] either wirelessly over standard 802.11b Wi-Fi or via an Ethernet cable. We capture all traffic to or from 
these devices which are connected to this router via WiFi or over an Ethernet cable. The experimental setup is 
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3 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
We categorise all IoT devices in two categories: (1) Hub is an IoT device which discovers and control other IoT devices. 
(2) Sensor is an IoT device which connects to the router directly and then communicates with IoT cloud services 
without using any Hub. We categorise our IoT devices in these categories as shown in Table 1 and analyse if there 
is any different traffic pattern by these two categories. 
   
Data Collection & Analysis 
For data collection from all IoT devices in our network, we run monitor and collect scripts on the router. First, we 
get a list of MAC addresses of the devices. On the router, we run monitor script on the interface that provides wifi 
access to the devices, filtering the traffic based on the MAC addresses we’re interested in using tcpdump [25]. At 
this stage, the traffic from different devices, different protocols are not separated, they reside in the same pcap 
files. On the other side, we schedule a cron job to periodically upload collected data to the Linux machine (on the 
same university network) for offline processing. One reason for this is that the router only provides limited 
persistence storage space, which is less than 50M. We then perform offline analysis on all the pcap files, and analyse 
traffic based on the metadata. We used tcpdump [25], a network traffic analysis utility, to get the meta-data 
information of the traffic flow. The information captured by the tcpdump is in this format. 
          
Analysis 
We next perform some simple analyses of traffic collected according to the setup shown in Figure 1, transmitted 
and received by the devices listed in Table 1. 
 
Protocol Breakdown 
Figure 2 presents a breakdown of the entire dataset by application protocol (Figure 2a), and by network and 
application protocol per device (Figures 2b and 2c). It is surprising to observe how much NTP, DNS and mDNS is in 
use by two devices (the Smartplug and DLink Motion Sensor). It is also interesting to observe that only one device 
makes significant use of a classical IoT protocol (MQTT, used by the Foo bot), though the Nest device also uses an 
IoT specific protocol (Weave) that was proprietary until released into Nest’s developer platform in 2015. 
Local Network. For pairing and device discovery, many IoT hub uses low power and low range communication 
protocols to con- nect to the devices (sensors). These protocols include Zigbee(IEEE 802.15.4) [2], Lora [24], Zwave 
[29], Lightwave [17], Bluetooth [12], RFID communication( LF, (125 - 134 kHz), HF, (13.56 MHz), UHF, (433, and 860-
960 MHz)) [23]. In our setup, we have few devices directly connecting to Hub using Zigbee, Bluetooth and WiFi. For 
example, Hive motion sensor connects to Hive hub using Zigbee protocol. We have three sensor devices which 
communicates to Mobile Phone Apps using Bluetooth and then Mobile apps, com- municates to app servers 
through the standard WiFi connection using the router. 
Encrypted Traffic. One of the interesting observations we would like to make from the collected traffic traces is to 
find how secure the communication between IoT devices and the outside world [10].  
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 Device Device 
Type 
Communication Protocols Encrypted Energy 
(watts) 
IP traffic rate 
(bytes/sec) 
1 Hive Starter Kit Hub [13] Hub Ethernet TCP, IGMP, Yes 1.8 120 
    ICMP    
2 Foobot Air Quality Monitor 
[8] 
Sensor WiFi TCP Yes 1.79 18 
3 TP-link Smart Plug [26] Hub WiFi UDP, TCP Both 2.05 100 
4 Google Home Mini [11] Hub WiFi UDP, TCP, Both 1.4  
    IGMP,    
    ICMP    
5 Amazon Echo Dot [3] Hub WiFi UDP, TCP, Both 1.95 125 
    ICMP    
6 Arlo Security Camera Base 
Sta- 
Hub Ethernet
 
& 
UDP, TCP Both 4.6 70 
 tion [5]  WiFi     
7 Nest Smoke Alarm [19] Sensor WiFi UDP, TCP Both NA 0.02 
8 D-Link Motion Sensor [7] Sensor WiFi UDP, TCP, Both 1.4 NA 
    IGMP    
9 Hive Motion Sensor [14] Sensor Zigbee NA yes Battery NA 
10 ParrotPot   Smart   Flower 
[21] 
Sensor Bluetooth NA NA Battery NA 
 Pot       
11 MiBand Smart Bracelet [28] Sensor Bluetooth NA NA Battery NA 
12 Smart Bluetooth Tracker [15] Sensor Bluetooth NA NA Battery NA 
 
Table 1: IoT devices and their traffic behaviour summary 
 
Figure 2: Traffic breakdown by protocol and device, 8th March to 11th April 2018 
 
As this is our preliminary analysis, at this stage we investigate if an IoT device sends unencrypted or encrypted 
traffic. We categorised traffic generated from each device based on application layer protocols (see summary in 
Figure 2c) and found that all IoT devices at least send some part of their traffic as HTTPS. We found that Hub IoT 
devices send more encrypted traffic (> 50%) as com- pared to Sensor IoT devices. At this stage of analysis, we have 
not investigated how secure is the use of HTTPS by different devices. 
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Traffic Patterns 
IoT traffic rate and pattern have a huge impact on the infrastructure planning and supported services. To 
understand, traffic pat- tern, we analysed time-series traffic of all IoT devices we have in our Experiment setup. We 
present an hour time-series data in Figure 3 and found that MQTT, HTTPS and NTP are continuous and more frequent 
traffic and DHCP is the less frequent. 
 
To make a preliminary investigation of traffic and service dependencies, we analysed 24 hours of data from of each 
device as well as one - week long traffic by calculating bandwidth with 5, 10, 15 minutes traffic aggregation window. 
We found there was not significant pattern difference with varying window sizes, so present our analysis here using 
15 minutes traffic aggregation window size on one week time-series traffic. We found following interesting 
observations. 
 
We looked at the traffic traces of individual devices and present 24-hrs traces. We found > 99% of the Hive hub (Figure 
4a) and Arlo Security Camera Hub (Figure 5c) total traffic composed of HTTPS packets and rest of the traffic include 
few periodic DHCP, NTP and DNS packets. Similarly, Foo bot majority traffic consists of MQTT running over TCP. Some 
of the devices like Smart Plug (see Figure 4e), Amazon Echo (see Figure 5a) and Dlink Home motion sensor (see 
Figure 5g) send frequent NTP traffic, and therefore, we can see it makes a significant percentage of total traffic send 
by these devices. As compared to all other devices, the traffic rate generated by Nest Smoke sensor is minimum 
when it is in its ideal listening mode; it sends total 6 packets a day (total around 180 bytes in a day, Figure 5e). Nest 
smoke sensor uses Weave protocol over TCP to communicates periodically twice a day to Nest Cloud Service. 
 
Figure 3: One-hour time-series of the traffic generated by 
IoT devices.  
 
Every dot in the graph represent a packet to show the 
traffic packets generated by various application layer 
protocols / services. 
  
 
 
Protocol & Service Dependency 
When deploying IoT devices it is unavoidable that one takes dependencies on different standard Internet LAN and 
WAN protocols and services. For example, we found DHCP message frequency is relatively frequent and periodic, 
varying from (4 to 6 packets per day) for all IoT devices in our Experiment Setup. DHCP is only a local LAN protocol 
however. More significantly, we see dependencies on DNS and NTP. We found that voice assistant hub devices such 
as Google home mini and Amazon Echo makes frequent DNS enquires to their own cloud services and servers. The 
various services queried over DNS are summarised in Table 2). 
 
We found NTP servers used by and frequency of NTP data generated by different devices varies significantly. There 
are few IoT devices like Hive hub, which access and exchange NTP during only setup process. The Foo bot air quality 
monitor and Nest smoke alarm uses their IoT protocols, MQTT and weave over TCP and uses embedded timing 
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protocols instead of standard NTP proto- cols. All IoT devices except TP-link communicate with their cloud services 
during initial setup phase as well for data APIs. This leads high risk TP-link smart plug communicates with global 
NTP Pool project servers [20]. 
 
We observed an interesting correlation between DNS queries and NTP traffic generated by TP-link smart plug 
and D-link Motion Sensor. Both these devices also make a large number of DNS queries to global NTP servers 
(DNS queries summary shown in Table 2). The total DNS traffic generated by just 4 devices makes nearly 12% of 
total traffic generated from our Network setup. On the other hand, Hive hub and Foo bot air quality monitor 
makes very few DNS queries to their servers. 
 
In our setup, only two devices are using IoT protocols, rest of the devices uses standard Internet application layer 
protocols. We found that protocols customised for IoT devices are more efficient in term of traffic bandwidth and 
also uses less standard service protocols such as NTP. However, these are highly dependent on communication with 
the device cloud services, which leads to high unavailability risk due to single point of failure. 
 
To realise smart buildings integrated with a large number and variety of IoT devices, we also made a very simple 
investigation of the energy consumption by these IoT devices and provide an estimate of additional energy 
requirements. We measured power consumed by IoT devices in our setup by connecting each device to a TP-
Link smart plug for a fixed interval and provided mean- average values in the Table 1. 
 
Finally, we used IP geolocation (using IP address allocation and routing data to infer where, geographically, a host 
with a particular IP address resides) to estimate the different countries hosting the services used by our devices. 
The results are in Table 3. Due to the strange and excessive use of NTP and DNS by the Echo and the Smartplug, 
both make use of the Internet-hosted services in dozens of countries. However, all the devices make use of Internet- 
hosted services in other countries, with most involving countries outside the EU. The implications of such devices 
and services be- come prevalent on the resilience and vulnerability to outside interference of our infrastructure are 
unclear and need further investigation. 
 
Conclusions 
This early stage IoT device traffic and service analysis provided us some early insight into the network and 
application layer protocol, bandwidth, and time-series behaviour of a range of IoT devices. This allows us to begin 
to explore the service and infrastructure dependencies that will be taken in “smart” environments due to 
deployment of IoT devices. We are continuing to analyse the data in more detail to better understand the 
implications of large-scale deployment of these devices. In order to get the kind of coverage required of the vast 
range of devices available, we are also exploring how to setup systems able to receive and automatically process 
trace data submitted by third-parties concerning other devices. Ultimately, we hope to produce tools that can form 
the basis of a certification process for IoT devices suitable for providing data to BIM levels 3 and 4. 
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                           (a) Hive Hub pattern                                                 (b) Hive Hub bandwidth 
 
  
                                 (c) Foo bot                                                         (d) Foo bot bandwidth 
 
  
                              (e) Smartplug                                                    (f) Smartplug bandwidth 
 
  
                              (g) Google Home                                              (h) Google Home bandwidth 
Figure 4: Time-series data representation of the traffic generated by each device, in terms of pattern in a 
24h period and bandwidth (in 15 minute buckets) over a whole week.  
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                        (a) Amazon Echo Dot                                 (b) Amazon Echo Dot bandwidth 
 
  
                             (c) Security Camera                                             (d) Security Camera bandwidth 
 
  
                            (e) Nest Smoke Alarm                         (f) Nest Smoke Alarm bandwidth 
 
  
                              (g) DLink Motion                                                    (h) DLink Motion bandwidth.  
Figure 5: Time-series data representation of the traffic generated by each device, in terms of pattern in a 24h 
period and bandwidth (in 15 minute buckets) over a whole week. 
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Device DNS Queries Frequency 
 google.com 4 
Hive Starter Kit hub honeycomb.fw.bgchprod.inf 19 
 broker.prod.bgchprod.info 4 
 broker-gw-eu.foobot.io 8 
Foobot Air Quality Monitor api.foobot.io 6 
 de.pool.ntp.org 9335 
TP-link Smart Plug uk.pool.ntp.org 9334 
 2.asia.pool.ntp.org 9330 
 ca.pool.ntp.org 9329 
 ru.pool.ntp.org 9329 
 0.cn.pool.ntp.org 9329 
 1.asia.pool.ntp.org 9329 
 time-a.nist.gov 9329 
 fr.pool.ntp.org 9328 
 us.pool.ntp.org 9326 
 clients1.google.com 30984 
Google Home Mini www.google.com 30977 
 channel.status.request.url 11973 
 clients4.google.com 7760 
 clients3.google.com 1088 
 android.googleapis.com 940 
 connectivitycheck.gstatic.com 551 
 time.google.com 551 
 cast.google.com 301 
 google.com 147 
 kindle-time.amazon.com 9991 
Amazon Echo Dot spectrum.s3.amazonaws.com 4124 
 ntp-g7g.amazon.com 2505 
 device-metrics-us.amazon.com 1482 
 2.android.pool.ntp.org 873 
 pindorama-eu.amazon.com 104 
 api.amazon.com 54 
 time-h.netgear.com 212 
Security Camera Kit time-g.netgear.com 212 
 mcs.netgear.com 38 
 updates.netgear.com 25 
 arlo-device.messaging.netgear.com 15 
 registration.ngxcld.com 8 
 advisor.ngxcld.com 6 
 xbroker2-z1.ngxcld.com 2 
 presence.ngxcld.com 2 
 vzwow62-z1-prod.vz.netgear.com 1 
 frontdoor.nest.com 37 
Nest Smoke Alarm log-rts01-iad01.devices.nest.com 22 
 czfe72.front01.iad01.production.nest.com 2 
 czfe44.front01.iad01.production.nest.com 2 
 czfe106.front01.iad01.production.nest.com 2 
 czfe39.front01.iad01.production.nest.com 2 
 czfe97.front01.iad01.production.nest.com 1 
 czfe68.front01.iad01.production.nest.com 1 
 czfe23.front01.iad01.production.nest.com 1 
 czfe42.front01.iad01.production.nest.com 1 
 ntp1.dlink.com 23010 
D-Link Motion Sensor wrpd.dlink.com 64 
 signal.mydlink.com 64 
 mp-eu-signal.auto.mydlink.com 48 
Table 2: IoT devices and their traffic behaviour summary  
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Device Country (and State if USA)  
camera IE NL CO-US EU GB  
dlinkmotion   OR-US VA-US IE CA-US SG  
JP 
echo VA-US IE MA-US WA-US N/A-US GB DE TX-US NL FR HU NV-US CA-US CH CA RU NJ-US 
BR UA SE BG PL AT BE DK AU LV NY-US PT CZ NZ FL-US KR MD MD-US SK GR HR IA-US 
IL-US IT KH LU MN-US MO-US NO PY RO WI-US BY CO-US ES LT CL CN DE-US EE GE 
IN-US IS JP KG KS-US LI MI-US NC SG TR ID-US UT-US 
 
foobot IE 
 
googlehome    CA-US N/A-US NE-US 
 
hivehub IE WA-US CA-US DE  
 
nestsmoke VA-US 
 
smartplug      CN MD-US CA GB RU FR DE IE TX-US SE CA-US SG KR JP HK NJ-US KZ FL-US TW KH AM ID 
NL NV-US N/A-US IQ NY-US DE-US SA AU IR NO WA-US VA-US NE-US MN-US CO-US TH MY 
GA-US LK GE DK MO-US IN UT-US MI-US IL-US KG AZ PH WI-US IA-US ID-US MV NC-US KS-
US OH-US OR-US PK PA-US VN RI-US MA-US IN-US AZ-US MM ES VT-US EU IL AR-US AE 
BD ME-US UZ SC-US TR AL-US NP 
 
Table 3: Packets transmitted to different countries 
 
